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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN W. HANSEN and / 
BEVERLY M. HANSEN, 
Plaintiffs and / 
Appellants, 
vs. / 
REUEL S. KOHLER and 
DOLORES M. KOHLER, his wife, / Case No. 14099 
Defendants and 
Respondents, / 
EARSEL G. PIERCE and 
PATRICIA B. PIERCE, his wife, / 
Intervening Defendants 
and Cross Claimants. / 
BRIEF OF INTERVENING DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Identification of the parties to the action herein shall 
be made by referring to Marvin W. Hansen and Beverly M. Hansen, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants as "Hansens"? to Reuel S. Kohler and 
Dolores M. Kohler, Defendants and Respondents as "Kohlers"; and 
to Earsel G. Pierce and Patricia B. Pierce, Intervening Defendants, 
Cross Claimants and Counterclaimants and Respondents as "Pierces". 
Hansens brought action in the Lower Court against 
Kohlers seeking an Order of the Court compelling the Kohlers 
to reconvey certain real property at Howell, Utah, to Hansens, 
or in the alternative, that the Kohlers pay the Hansens 
$7,500.00, together with commission and interest, and that 
said amount be a lien upon the property recorded in the 
name of the Pierces. Hansens filed a Notice of Lis Pendens 
with the County Recorder wherein the property at Howell 
was situated at the time when the property had been conveyed 
by Kohlers to Pierces. Pierces entered the action as Interven-
ing Defendants, Cross Claimants, and Counterclaimants alleging 
a loss of profits resulting from the loss of vendibility 
of the property purchased by Pierces from Kohlers because 
of the filing of the Lis Pendens of the Hansens; that the 
conduct of the Hansens was outrageous and intolerable under 
contemporaneous community standards, and that said acts were 
wilfully and maliciously done, thereby seeking damages for the 
distress, anxiety, and anguish inflicted upon the Pierces; the 
Pierces seeking to recover from Hansens punitive and exemplary 
damages, as well as attorney's fees proximately resulting from 
the conduct of the Hansens. 
The Pierces sought to recover from the Kohlers Attorney 
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fees and Court costs for the defense of the title given by 
Warranty Deed by the Kohlers to the Pierces resulting from 
the cause of action alleged by the Hansensf and further, for 
any other damages as may result and imposed upon the Pierces 
as the consequence of the claim of the Hansens. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
The cause of action by Hansens as against Kohlers 
was dismissed with prejudice and on its merits as no cause 
of action. 
The Cross Claim of the Cross Claimants, Pierces, 
as against Kohlers was dismissed with prejudice and on the 
merits as no cause of action. 
The cause of action as set forth in the Counterclaim 
of Pierces was granted allowing Judgment in favor of Pierces 
and against Hansens in the sum of $4,166.05. 
On Motion for New Trial by Hansens, the Court reaffirmed 
its previous Judgment but modified the Judgment as to money 
and damages allowed to Pierces with the reduction of the 
Judgment to the sum of $2,596.75. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Hansens seek reversal of the Judgment of the Lower 
Court granted in favor of Kohlers and against Hansens and 
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Hansens further seek reversal of the Judgment in favor of 
Pierces and against Hansens. 
Pierces seek a modification of Judgment in favor of 
Pierces and against Hansens restoring the original Judgment 
of the Lower Court, wherein the Court awarded loss of profit 
on sale of home to Pierces and, on Judgment for New Trial, 
modified the Judgment by reducing same and disallowing $1,500*00 
previously awarded to Pierces for loss of profit on sale of 
home and Pierces further seek modified Judgment awarding puni-
tive, exemplary and personal damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pierces will not make any statement of facts as 
pertains to the original action as between the Hansens and 
Kohlers, in that the statement of facts by Hansens and the 
statement of facts by Kohlers should be adequate to inform 
the Court. 
Kohlers did convey to the Pierces the home and property 
in Howell, Utah, by a Warranty Deed, which was recorded with 
the County Recorder as of October 18, 1971, together with a 
Real Estate Mortgage given to the Farmers Home Administration 
(Exhibits 12, 14). On October 19, 1971, a Lis Pendens was 
recorded by Hansens as against the same property conveyed 
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previously by Kohlers1 Warranty Deed to Pierces (Exhibit 16). 
Mr. Pierce's employment was terminated at Thiokol in 
December of 1972 (R-161), at which time he went to Little 
Rock, Arkansas, for purposes of employment (R-161), having 
first entered into an Earnest Money Agreement for the sale 
of the Howell home and property to Mr. and Mrs. Nicholas 
CR-61.«- R-63, Exhibit 17), and for a consideration in the 
sum of $12,300.00, which Agreement was entered into March 28, 
1972. 
Pierces discovered for the first time that a Lis Pendens 
had been filed against their home and property as a result 
of an attempt to complete the sale of the property to the 
Nicholases when a title search resulted in the revealing of 
the Lis Pendens. (R-217) 
The Farmers Home Administration refused to make a loan 
to the Nicholases for purchase of the property because of 
the filed Lis Pendens (R-217), even though the loan had previously 
been approved by the Federal Housing Administration to the 
Nicholases. Title insurance would not be issued by the title 
insurance company because of the Lis Pendens (R-51) and upon 
advice of Attorney Dale M. Dorius as counsel for the Nicholases, 
the Nicholases would not consummate the sale because of the 
Lis Pendens and the refusal of F.H.A. to approve the purchase 
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of the real property (R-217), and the Nicholases resided in 
the home for eight months without payment of rent while attempt-
ing to await clearance of title to property so that they could 
purchase the property from Pierces (R-1611. 
Subsequent to Nicholases moving from the property after 
an eight-month occupancy, a new buyer was obtained by the 
Realty Company on behalf of Pierces, but after three months 
occupancy, the new purchasers also could not buy the property 
because of the pending Lis Pendens. (R-208, -209) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RECORDING OF LIS PENDENS CONSTITUTED SLANDER OF TITLE 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Olsen vs. Kidman/ 235 
P.2d 510, (Sept., 1951), adopted the Rule set forth in Gudger 
vs. Mantan, 21 Cal.2d 537, 134 P.2d 217, as to what constituted 
an action of slander of title when the Court adopted the 
California ruling by restating: 
Slander of title is effected by anyone, who, without 
privilege, publishes untrue and disparaging state-
ments with respect to the property of another, under 
such circumstances as would lead a reasonable person 
to foresee that a prospective purchaser or lessee thereof 
might abandon his intentions. ***lt is an invasion of 
the interest of the vendibility of property. In order 
to commit the tort, actual malice or ill will is unnecessary. 
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The Utah Court by its holding in the Olsen vs. Kidman 
case, supraf specifically clarified the previous ruling of 
the Court in Dowse vs. Doris Trust Company, 208 P.2d 956/ 
and its holding in Sproul vs. Parks, 210 P.2d 436, wherein 
the wrongful action of filing a Lis Pendens therein were 
actuated by malice in fact/ by denying the allegation of 
the Defendant and Appellant/ Leslie Kidman, that the Utah 
cases and the law generally regarding slander of title require 
that before liability can be found/ the Recorder of the slander-
ous document must have known that he asserted a false claim 
without any foundation or right, by specifically stating 
that in order to commit the tort, actual malice or ill will 
is unnecessary. 
In the instant matter before the Court/ there is no 
allegation that there was specific malice at the time of 
the filing of the Lis Pendens by the Hansens, but the record 
does show that as a matter of fact/ that upon the Pierces 
advising the counsel for Hansens, that the filing of the 
Lis Pendens was preventing the sale of the property and injuring 
the vendibility of such property by reason of the Lis Pendens 
CR-109J, and by further pointing out to the Hansens and their 
counsel, that at the time of the filing of the Lis Pendens 
by the Hansens, that the property had already been conveyed 
to the Pierces by Kohlers with a Warranty Deed and without 
any knowledge on the part of the Pierces that there was any 
claim by Pierces as against said property (R-173) at the 
time of the purchase, that the continued refusal of the Hansens 
and their counsel to remove their Lis Pendens, and in fact 
not removing same until February 5, 1974, the day the actual 
trial commenced in the District Court (R-175), which is the 
action presently before this Court, that there, in fact, 
would not be difficulty to find malice in fact on the part 
of the Hansens and their counsel, in the guise of economic 
duress and coercion by their continued failure and refusal 
to remove a Lis Pendens against property, which at the time 
of the recording of the Lis Pendens was in the name of the 
Pierces, who were bona fide purchasers for value without 
any knowledge whatsoever of any claim by the Hansens to said 
property. (R-173) 
This Court further pointed out in the Olsen vs. 
Kidman case, supra, the citation in Clause B of the Restatement 
of Torts, Section 6625, which states: 
It is not necessary that the publisher of a disparaging 
statement know or believe it to be false nor is it necessary 
that as a reasonable man he should know or believe that 
it is untrue. Furthermore, it is immaterial that he 
has reasonable grounds for his belief in its truth. As 
in an action for defamation, if the other essentials 
to liability are present, the publisher of disparaging 
matter takes the risk, that it is untrue. 
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The action before this Court is not one brought 
for libel and slander through the use of words, which are 
slanderous per se, but is based upon the recording of a document 
which is false and untrue and is based upon the legal slander 
of title, which prevented the Pierces from effecting the 
sale of their property. 
The Pierces purchased the property on October 18, 
1971, (R-160, Exhibit 12) and the Lis Pendens was not removed 
until February 5, 1974, (R-175) the property had previously 
been conveyed by Hansens to Kohlers on April 2, 1969. (Pi.Ex.3) 
Counsel for the Hansens voluntarily became a witness 
in the action at time of trial and stated for the record, that 
the Warranty Deed vesting ownership of the property in the 
Pierces was filed prior to Hansens1 Lis Pendens (R-243), 
and that said counsel, together with his client, Mr. Hansen, 
visited the home of Pierces at Howell, Utah, and advised 
Mrs. Pierce, who was home alone, "We got a lawsuit filed", (R-
243), and further admitted stating to Mrs. Pierce "If you're 
ahead of us," and he indicated that they were, "then, I said, 
I am behind you and you're ahead of me". (R-244) 
Mrs. Pierce testified that Mr. Hansen and his counsel 
came to the Pierces1 home in March, 1972, at which time Mrs. Pierce 
showed Mr. Hansen and his counsel a copy of the Warranty Deed 
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conveying the property from Kohlers to Pierces and their 
title insurance policy (R-97) (Int.Def. Ex. 12, 15), to which 
Mr. Robbins responded by saying: 
Well, I can show you the Lis Pendens we have filed 
at the Courthouse. And proceeded to take it from 
his brief case.* CR-971 
It is submitted to the Court that the filing of 
a Lis Pendens against property recorded in the name of a bona 
fide purchaser for value who is not the Defendant of the 
Complaint to which the Lis Pendens has reference constitutes 
a slander of title. 
POINT II 
LIS PENDENS IS QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE 
The Appellants, Hansens, have made a point in their 
Brief to this Court, that the filing of their Lis Pendens was 
privileged, in that it was part of a judicial procedure while, 
at the same time, setting forth the facts that the Complaint 
filed was against the Kohlers only and not against the Pierces, 
and that the Lis Pendens filed was against property already 
duly recorded and validly sold for a consideration to the 
Pierces* CAppellant's Brief, p. 29, 311 
Hansens quote from Albertson vs. Raboff/ 295 P.2d 
4Q5, a California case, to state the premise that a Lis Pendens 
is a privileged judicial proceedings, but the California case 
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law and statutory law does not protect one who makes a false 
claim by filing a Lis Pendens against property other than 
the party entitled or alleging ownership of such, real property 
as in the instant matter before the Court. 
The State of Utah has ruled to the contrary in a 
matter such as the instant filing of Lis Pendens against 
Pierces as set forth in Birch vs. Fuller, 337 P.2d 964, 6 
Ut.2d 79. The Birch case is an action wherein a Lis Pendens 
was filed, and as a result thereof, an action for slander 
of title was instituted by the Plaintiff/ and the finding 
in favor of the Plaintiff in the Lower Court was affirmed 
by the Utah Supreme Court/ wherein the Court awarded to the 
Plaintiff a money Judgment for slander of title/ the Court 
stating: 
Defendants say the evidence does not support a 
slander of title action, nor does it evince bad 
faith or malice. It is difficult to discern what-
ever motives Defendants had in filing the Lis 
Pendens/ particularly in view of the transmission 
by one of the Defendants of a rather insulting 
letter to the Plaintiffs some two months earlier. 
We believe the Court*s conclusion to have been 
justified. Also, there appears to be no basis 
for disturbing the Courtfs conclusion/ that the 
Defendants had no legal or equitable title. 
In the instant matter before the Court/ we already have 
the judicial determination in the Lower Court/ that there was 
absolutely no cause of action by Hansens as against Kohlers 
which resulted in a forthwith dismissal of the cause of action 
set forth by Hansens in the Lower Court, but in addition 
thereto, there could be no question of the bad faith and 
malice of the Hansens, in that there was an absolute refusal 
to remove the Lis Pendens even with knowledge of the prior 
recording of the Deed of the Pierces to the Lis Pendens of 
Hansens, CR-243, -2461/ even though on three separate occasions 
the Pierces sought to have Hansens remove the Lis Pendens 
so that the property could be sold to an earnest money buyer. 
(R-175) 
It is the contention of the Hansens, that they would 
have removed the Lis Pendens had they been asked to remove 
same, while ignoring the evidence set forth in the record 
wherein the Pierces testify that on three occasions they 
attempted to have counsel for the Hansens remove the Lis 
Pendens and the attitude of counsel is clearly evident in 
his direct testimony in this matter, wherein he stated as 
a witness, that he did not consider (R-103), that the filing 
of a Notice of Intervention by the Pierces gave counsel for 
the Hansens a clue that there might be desire on the part 
of the Pierces to remove the Lis Pendens, and that even the 
filing of the Complaint of the Pierces setting forth an action 
of slander of title and a plea for damages for the loss of 
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vendibility of property did not appear to counsel as a request 
for the removal of the Lis Pendens (R-103), and as a matter 
of record, it is a fact that the Lis Pendens was not removed 
until February 5, 1974, which was the day of the trial of 
this action in the Lower Court. (R-175) 
The contention.of the Hansens, that there is an 
absolute privilege to file a Lis Pendens, has been answered 
in the negative by the Utah Supreme Court in Olsen vs. Kidman, 
supra, which is consistent with the law of the great weight 
of authority as to such allegation of privilege. 
In 39 A.L.R.2d 840, p. 843, there is an annotation 
of cases under the heading: 
The wrongful filing for a record of a document which 
casts a cloud upon another's title to or interest in 
realty is clearly such an act of publication as to 
give rise to an action for slander of title, if prova-
ble damages result. 
Under this heading, there are a large collection of cases from 
the States of Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, 
Wyoming, Canada, and the Tenth Circuit Court of the United 
States. 
It has been further held in a series of cases, that 
in an attempt to escape liability for slander of title on the 
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ground that the instrument alleged to have been wrongfully-
recorded did not in fact affect Plaintiffs' title, have been 
generally unsuccessful, with the Courts usually taking the 
view, that any wrongful recordation which would reasonably 
give pause to the ordinary purchaser may be actionable. 
This point of view has been expressed in Greenlake Investment 
Company vs. Swarthout, 161 S.W.2d 697; also in First National 
Bank vs. Moore, 7 S.W.2d 145, Texas Civil Appeal, 1928; Glimack 
Oil Company vs. Weiner, 150 Kan. 430, 94 P.2d 309, (1939). 
It is the direct testimony of Ronald W. Robbins, 
who was County Supervisor for the Farmers Home Administra-
tion, United States Department of Agriculture, (R-211), who 
testified that Pierces had a buyer, a Mr. Nicholas, who filed 
application with F.H.A. on April 5, 1972, for the purchase 
of the property, and that the loan was approved and a check 
was issued in the amount of $11,500.00, which was the balance 
due after downpayment for the purchase of the property from 
the Pierces CR-217}, and that the sale did not go through 
because of the Lis Pendens and the failure of the Pierces 
to have it removed. CR-220, -221) 
POINT III 
PIERCES ARE ENTITLED TO ALL DAMAGES 
OCCASIONED BY FILING OF WRONGFUL LIS PENDENS 
The Restatement of the Law on Torts, Vol. 3, Sec. 624, 
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p. 325, states: 
One who, without privilege to do so, publishes 
matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's 
property and landf chattelsf or intangible things, 
under such circumstances as would lead a resonable 
man to foresee the conduct of a third person 
as purchaser or lessee thereof might be determined, 
thereby is liable for pecuniary loss resulting 
to the other from the impairment of vendibility 
thus caused. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., defines the term 
of uvendibility" or to be "vendible" as being merchantable. 
In the instant matter before this Court, the Pierces 
had entered into an actual real estate contract for the sale 
of their property tR-61, -63} (Def.Exh.17) and did not become 
aware of the Lis Pendens on said property until a title check 
was made by F.H.A. prior to delivering up of money in the 
sum of $11,500.00 as and for the Purchase Money Agreement 
of Nicholas for the purchase of the property of the Pierces 
(R-68), and upon discovery of the Lis Pendens, F.H.A. upon 
the recommendation of its attorney, Mr. Hatfield (R-217), 
denied the loan and returned the check to be voided. 
In Collins vs. Whitehead, 34 F. 121, the Court held, 
that where the Plaintiff was desirous of selling his land 
to obtain money for other undisclosed enterprises and was 
hindered from doing so by the Defendants1 act, in filing 
a record of papers stating that the Defendant had entered 
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into a valid, enforceable contract for the purchase of property, 
was held sufficient to justify the allowance of substantial 
general damages, although there was no proof of specific 
damages, the Court saying that the injury to the Plaintiff 
was real, since he was compelled to bring suit to remove 
the cloud from his title, and in the interim, his property 
was useless to him and that it would be a reproach to the law 
to give him only nominal damages. 
In the instant matter before this Court, there need 
be no speculation as to the damages suffered by the Pierces. 
Coley vs. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 272 P. 1045, was 
an action wherein it was alleged that the Defendant maliciously 
filed an Abstract of Judgment, purporting to constitute a 
lien against Plaintiff's real estate at a time when the Defendant 
knew the Judgment had been suspended by an Appeal Bond. The 
Court held that the allegation, that the malicious recordation 
decreased the value of the real estate, had rendered it less 
marketable was true, and that it was not necessary that Plaintiff 
show that the wrongful act interferred with some special 
opportunity to sell or deal with the land as might be true if 
the acts complained were oral. 
Davis vs. Wood, 61 Cal.App.2d 788, 143 P.2d 740, was 
an action wherein the Defendant wrongfully recorded a notice of 
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location of a mining claim on land upon which Plaintiff held 
a leasehold interest, thereby casting a cloud upon Plaintiff's 
title. It was alleged that the recording decreased the value 
of the leasehold interest and rendered it unmarketable. 
The Court held that it was not necessary that the Plaintiff 
allege that a particular sale was lost because of the wrongful 
acts, although on special demurrer, the Trial Court might 
be justified in requiring the damages to be set forth with 
greater particularity. 
Greenlake Investment Company vs. Swarthout, 161 
S.W.2d 697, was an action wherein the Defendant allegedly, 
fraudulently, and in bad faith recorded a claim of lien on 
the Plaintifffs real estate, and that as a result, a cloud 
was cast upon the Plaintiff's title and sale of the property 
was prevented and hindered. The Plaintiff filed an action 
seeking actual and punitive damages. The Court held that 
the Complaint stated a good cause of action, even though 
there was no allegation that the Plaintiff suffered actual 
damages, and the Court stated that on proof of the charges, 
Plaintiff would be entitled to at least nominal actual damages, 
and that if such allowance were made, punitive damages would 
also be allowed. 
Pierces in their Counterclaim alleged and proved the 
reasonable attorney's fees in this matter should have been 
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$1,500.00 as to the Pierces, (R-319) and the record before 
this Court makes obvious that such a fee is a most moderate 
fee for the number of appearances, Motions, pleadings, and 
Legal Memorandums that have been filed in this matter, and 
that there is no need for apportionment of attorney's fees 
as between the services rendered by the counsel for Pierces 
as to the services necessitated by the action of Hansens, 
in that the Kohler defense required no Depositions, and that 
the great number of hearings on Motions and pleadings were 
compelled by Attorney for Hansens rather than Attorney for 
Kohlers. 
Testimony given under oath by Attorney David J. 
Knowlton reasonably set his services in at $650.00 for travel 
and for actual trial held in the matter (R-152), which would 
leave only $850.00 as the amount claimed by Attorney Pete N. 
Vlahos, Esq., for the attending of the two Depositions, making 
new Interrogatories, answering of pleadings, appearances before 
the Lower Court on the various Motions made, research, and 
making of Legal Memorandums, and interviewing of clients and 
witnesses involved in the matter. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that recovering 
of attorney's fees was established in Dowse vs. Doris Trust 
Company, supra, wherein the Court stated: 
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Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense 
for litigation. Plaintiff testified that he 
had some inquiries about the land, but had been 
unable to sell the property with the Defendant's 
instrument on record, and that was the reason 
he brought the suit to quiet title. Defendant 
did not deny that he had placed the instrument 
on record, knowing that he did not have an enforce-
able contract by the land for the purpose of 
preventing Plaintiff from mortgaging or selling 
In the Statement of Facts herein set forth and 
in the quotation and citation of the record as has been 
done hereinabove, there is ample evidence that Hansens did 
not have an enforceable contract against the land and have 
not at any time reasonably explained why they did not timely 
remove the Lis Pendens so that the damages would not have 
occurred to the Pierces. 
In the case of Olsen vs. Kidman, supra, this Court 
affirmed the decision of the District Court of Box Elder 
County and this Court reinstated the prayer of the Plaintiff 
for attorney's fees when the Lower Court reduced the amount 
for attorney's fees prayed for by the Plaintiff. In Olsen 
vs. Kidman, supra, the attorney testified as to what was 
the reasonable fee for services which he performed against 
which there was no cross examination*, and the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that what is a reasonable compensation for 
legal services as testified to by a party is not binding 
upon the Trial Court, but is advisory only. This Court further 
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found that the amount prayed for by the party-Plaintiff 
and testified to by the attorney was a reasonable sum and 
re-established the attorney's fees testified to in the Lower 
Court. 
There can be no doubt that this Court has taken 
a stand as to whether or not the Petitioner is entitled 
to the loss of profit in the sale of the property, and the 
Court in Dowse vs. Doris Trust Company, supra, cited from the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 633, pp. 347-348, 
as follows: 
The pecuniary loss for which a publisher of disparaging 
matter is liable under the rules as stated in Sections 
624 and 626 - 627 is restricted to: 
Cal That pecuniary loss which directly and immediately 
results from the impairment of the vendibility 
of a thing in question caused by publication of a 
disparaging matter, and 
(bL The expense of litigation reasonably necessary 
to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement 
upon the other!s property and a thing or upon 
the quality thereof. 
The Court further stated its Rule of Law in the case 
as follows: 
Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable expense 
of litigation. Plaintiff testified that he had 
some inquiries about the land, but had been unable 
to sell the property with Defendant's instrument 
on record, and that was the reason he brought 
the suit to quiet title. Defendant did not deny 
that he placed the instrument on record, knowing 
that he did not have an enforceable contract by 
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the land, for the purpose of preventing Plaintiff 
from mortgaging or selling it. Under such circum-
stances/ the Court did not err in directing a 
verdict in favor of Plaintiff as to the tspecial 
damages. 
In the instant matter before this Court/ the testimony 
before the Court revealed that there was a period of eight 
months/ and during such period of timef no rent was paid 
by the Nicholases who were the prospective purchasers for the 
property while they were waiting for a valid title conveyance 
to them of the property. (R-206/ -207) It was further testified 
by Mr. Robbins of the Farmers Home Administration/ that there 
was an additional period of approximately five months wherein 
said premises were vacant/ owing to the inability of the 
parties to sell the land. (R-220) 
It was further testified to by a real estate expert 
CR-2061 and by the Pierces (R-164), that the premises had 
a reasonable rental value of at least $95.00 a month. 
The Court in its Judgment as rendered on December 15/ 
19.741 determined that a preponderance of the evidence showed 
that as a direct and proximate cause of unfounded and unwarranted 
filing of a Lis Pendens by Hansens and the refusal to remove 
samef the Pierces incurred damages as follows: 
(a) Out-of-pocket special damages in the total 
amount of $1,196.75. 
Cbl Damages for the loss of sale of the real property 
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in question in the amount of $1,500.00. 
(c) Damages for loss of rents concerning said real 
property for a period of eight months at the rate of $50.00 
per month for a total of $400.00. 
(d) Reasonable attorneyfs fees incurred in connection 
with this proceeding in the amount of $1,000.00, for a total 
verdict of $4,096.75, plus costs in the amount of $69.30, 
for a total Judgment in the amount of $4,166.05. (R-464) 
Following the verdict of the Court for the Pierces 
and against Hansens, Hansens filed a Motion for a New Trial 
(R-467), which was denied by the Court (R-497). 
The Court subsequently filed a modification of its 
Memorandum Decision and reduced the Judgment of the Pierces 
disallowing the $1,500.00 that would have been realized by 
the Pierces as a profit from the sale of the premises had 
they been allowed to close the sale by removal of the Lis 
Pendens by the Hansens, and the Court did thereby reduce 
the Judgment to $2,596.75. CR-479). 
The reasoning of the Court in reducing and denying 
the $1,500.00 was based upon the Court finding that the price 
paid for the property by Pierces was $11,570.00 rather than 
$10,000.00 and did find that the price to be received on the 
sale of the property would be $12,300.00, but alleged that the 
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Pierces would have had to pay a sales commission and/ therefore, 
they would not have realized any profit from the sale of 
the home. (R-479) 
The testimony of the Pierces clearly show that the 
amount paid for the property was $10/500.00 (R-224) (Def.Exh.14), 
and that the sale price for the property was $12/300.00. (R-163) 
(Pef.Exh.171 The record further shows that there was expenditure 
by the Pierces after the purchase of the home for improvements 
made thereon and the Court has added the improvement costs 
in and has then deducted a real estate commission of the 
sale of property six percent for a sale which did not occur 
but for which there could be liability to the Pierces by the 
deduction logically/ that if the sale had occurred/ that that 
would have reduced the profits. 
It is submitted to the Court that the original Judgment 
of the Court allowing the $lf500.00 profit of the sale of the 
home by the Pierces to the Nicholases had it been consummated 
was the damages suffered by the Piercesf and that there is 
nothing in the record showing that there is no liability 
upon the Pierces for payment to the realty agency of the sales 
commission, and in addition/ the Hansens should not be able 
to benefit by their own wrong by being given the benefit of 
the bargain by a reduction in the loss of profits of the home 
to the Pierces in said amount of $1/500.00. 
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It is further a matter of record/ that the real 
value established for the rental value of the home was in 
a minimal sum of $95.00 (R-164, -2061, but that the Court 
in entering its Judgment allowed only $50.00 a month rental 
for eight months, that the Nicholases lived in the home without 
any rental payments while waiting to obtain clear title by 
Pierces obtaining a removal of the Lis Pendens from the Hansens, 
and the Court should have awarded to the Pierces the reasonable 
rental value of the property which was in the minimal sum 
of $95.00 per month, and further, that the home was in limbo 
for an additional five-month period (R-220), and that additional 
rental for that five-month period at $95.00 a month should have 
been awarded to the Pierces. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED ADDITIONAL DAMAGES 
The Pierces in their Counterclaim and prayer alleged 
that the conduct of the Hansens was outrageous and intolerable 
under contemporaneous community standards and that the acts of 
the Hansens in filing and failing to remove upon demand the 
Lis Pendens was done maliciously and wilfully and that as a 
direct and proximate result of the conduct, that the Pierces 
suffered mental stress, anxiety, and anguish and prayed for 
the sum of $10,000.00. (R-323) 
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The Counterclaim and prayer of the Counterclaimants, 
Pierces, further alleged that as a result of the wilful, 
wanton, and malicious conduct of the Hansens, that the Pierces 
were entitled to punitive and exemplary damages in the sum 
of $5,000.00. 
The legal basis for the first claim of the Pierces 
is based upon the conduct of the Hansens as was exemplified 
in the findings of this Court in the case of Samms vs. Eccles, 
358 P.2 344, wherein this Court found that the conduct by 
one that was outrageous and intolerable under contemporaneous 
community standards and which was done maliciously and wilfully, 
and wherein as a result thereof, the injured party suffered 
mental distress, anxiety, and anguish, that an award of damages 
should be made and so found in that action. 
The claim of the Pierces as to the punitive and 
exemplary damages is based upon the traditional findings 
by this Court, that where one does a wrongful act which was 
wilful, wanton, and malicious, that the awarding of punitive 
damages is done to discourage future conduct of a like nature 
by such persons. 
There was no finding whatsoever in the Lower Court 
as to either of these issues and it is the contention of 
the Pierces, that the conduct enumerated in the Statement 
of Facts above, and hereinbelow sumarized, warranted such 
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a finding and Judgment* 
Mr. Pierce's employment at Thiokol Chemical Corpora-
tion was terminated and in order to find additional employment 
(R-161), he was compelled to move to Little Rock, Arkansas, 
for the purpose of obtaining new employment (R-161). 
The duty fell upon Mrs. Pierce to sell the home, 
which she did by listing the property for sale with a realtor. 
CDef.Exh.14) 
There was no knowledge by either of the Pierces, that 
there was any Lis Pendens or encumbrance upon their property 
that would prevent resale of the property. (R-173, -188) 
The episode hereinabove testified to by Mrs. Pierce 
CR-96) and admitted by counsel for Hansens as a witness (R-
96) related the visitation by Mr. Hansen and his counsel to 
the home of the Pierces, where Mrs. Pierce was confronted in 
her home by Mr. Hansen and his attorney and advised that a 
Lis Pendens had been filed and that a claim had been made 
against the property of the Pierces (R-96), and that even 
after showing to Mr. Hansen and his counsel a copy of a Warranty 
Deed from Kohler, together with title insurance evidencing 
that there was no claim of any kind against the property as 
of the time of purchase of the property by Pierces from Kohlers, 
that Hansen and counsel continued to stand fast on their Lis 
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Pendens. (R-97), and that as a direct and proximate result 
of said visitation, Mrs. Pierce was greatly upset, suffering 
mental anguish and emotional distress and was left in tears 
CR-991, and that upon advising her husband of the claim (R-99), 
Mr. Pierce left his employment by quitting his job and coming 
home to attempt to straighten out the allegation of the claim 
by the Hansens. (R-168) 
That the Pierces made a visitation to the office 
of the counsel for Hansens, after first having spoken to 
counsel for Kohler (R-169), and after advising counsel for 
Hansens, that Pierces were being forced to move from the 
State of Utah and had placed their home for sale and could 
not sell it with the Lis Pendens pending against said property, 
they were advised by counsel for Hansens, that they should 
talk to their title insurance carrier. (R-174), and were 
advised by the Pierces that they had already done that and 
were advised by the title insurance carrier that at the time 
of the issuing of the title policy, that the property was 
unencumbered and did not have a Lis Pendens filed against 
it and that, therefore, there was no liability on the title 
insurance carrier for a Lis Pendens filed subsequent to a 
policy of title insurance. (R-167) To which counsel for 
Hansens invited them to join in a suit, stating "the more the 
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merrier". (R-174) 
Subsequent thereto, Mrs. Pierce joined her husband 
and moved to Texas, where he had employment (R-168), believing 
that some way the property could be sold regardless of the 
Lis Pendens. (R-168) 
Subsequent thereto with the failure of the earnest 
money buyers who were residing in the Pierces' Howell home 
for eight months and not paying any rent, waiting for issuance 
of title to them (R-164, R-208), the Pierces made another 
trip to Salt Lake City to speak to counsel for Hansens in 
an additional attempt to have the Lis Pendens removed (R-
168), and advised Hansens and counsel that they were unable 
to make the home payments and would lose the home without 
being able to make a sale of the property to the Nicholases, 
which was refused. (R-169) 
This was in November, 1972, (R-168), the Pierces 
engaged the present counsel in an attempt to obtain a removal 
of the Lis Pendens and a Motion to File as Intervenor was 
filed (R-309), and with the consent of the Court, a Counterclaim 
and Cross Claim was filed by the Pierces in this matter. 
(R-319) 
Counsel for the Hansens compelled the attendance 
of both the Pierces to come at their own expense from Texas to 
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Lake City for purposes of Deposition (R-186), and the Pierces 
attended at separate times in order to have one of the parents 
home with their four children, both compelled to attend Deposi-
tions requested and ordered by counsel for Hansens. (R-186) 
Both of the Pierces being employed in Texas. (R-178) 
The Pierces, of course, were again compelled to 
attend trial in Brigham City, again leaving their jobs and 
this time their children with a babysitter for the purpose 
of being present at a two-day trial. (R-186) 
It is to be noted that the Lis Pendens was not removed 
until the first day of the trial, which occurred on February 5, 
1974, (R-l, R-175) and that a Warranty Deed conveyance of 
the title to the property had been made by the Hansens to 
Kohlers on April 2, 1969, with the Kohlers conveying by Warranty 
Deed to the Pierces on October 18, 1971, and the Lis Pendens 
being filed subsequent to that time (R-319). 
It should further be noted by the Court, that a 
foreclosure of the property was made (R-207) by Farmers Home 
Administration for nonpayment and breach of Promissory Note 
and a Mortgage by the Pierces. 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that there 
are adequate grounds to find that the conduct hereinabove set 
forth by the Hansens, even if excusable for the original filing 
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of a Lis Pendens by reason of a Complaint against the Kohlers, 
which the Lower Court has found to be totally unfounded and 
which not only destroyed the vendibility of the Pierces1 
property, but caused them such great physical and economic 
upheaval by the continued unreasoned, wilful, and wanton 
refusal to remove the Lis Pendens, did constitute such conduct 
as was outrageous and intolerable under contemporaneous community 
standards, and that the subsequent acts of the Hansens was mali-
ciously and wilfully done, and that as a direct and proximate 
result of such conduct, that the Pierces did suffer mental 
distress, anxiety, and anguish, and should have been entitled 
to an award for such conduct, and further, that the Court 
should have given notice to the Hansens of such arrogant 
use of the Courts and of legal process which was totally 
unfounded should have been deterred by an award of punitive 
damages as well to the Pierces, 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the 
modified Judgment of the Court in awarding the bare bone but 
partial expenses and loss to the Pierces was at best a minimal 
Judgment and that the original Judgment of the Court would 
more reasonably have reflected the actual loss suffered by the 
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Pierces and the Pierces should have been awarded the additional 
$1,500.00 for loss of profit on the home, and further, that 
this Court should give notice to the type of conduct herein 
set forth by modification of the Judgment make an award to 
the Pierces of the additional actual damages suffered by the 
Pierces, as well as an addition for punitive and exemplary 
damages, and that the Court should sustain the Judgment of 
the Lower Court and modify the Judgment to reflect the actual 
injury inflicted upon the Pierces. 
DATED this j% day of September, 1975. 
Respectfully' submitted 
sto? 
DAVID J. KNOWLTON of VLAHOS & KNOWLTON 
"U. VLAHOS Of VLAHOS & KNOWLTON 
Attorneys for Intervening Defendants, 
Cross Claimants and Respondents 
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